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Abstract
In this paper we provide arguments against the dominant role played by the notion of pure sate within
the orthodox textbook account of quantum mechanics. We will argue that the origin of this notion is
intrinsically related to the widespread empirical-positivist understanding of physics according to which
‘theories describe actual observations of subjects (or agents)’. We will then show how there exists,
within the notion of pure state, an inconsistent scrambling of two mutually incompatible definitions.
On the one hand, a contextual (basis dependent) operational definition which attempts to provide an
intuitive physical grasp in terms of the certain predictions of measurement outcomes; and on the other
hand, an invariant (basis independent) purely abstract mathematical definition which has no direct
physical content. We end the paper with a discussion of a possible way of out of this metaphysical-
operational conundrum through following an interpretation of the Born rule in terms of the intensive
quantification of physical existents.
Keywords: pure state, mixture, quantum mechanics, graphs.
1 Pure States in Quantum Mechanics
The notion of pure state plays an essential role within the many debates that take place today within
the orthodox literature discussing about Quantum Mechanics (QM) as well as within its most recent
technical developments and applications within quantum information processing. Its role, introduced
during the axiomatic formulation of the theory in the 1930s, has become increasingly dominant establishing
an ontological primacy over the so called mixed states. As explained by David Mermin [21, p. 758]:
“[P]eople distinguish between pure and mixed states. It is often said that a system is in a pure state if
we have maximum knowledge of the system, while it is in a mixed state if our knowledge of the system is
incomplete.” The explicit reference to “our knowledge” is strictly related to the well known operational
definition of a pure state: ‘If a quantum system is prepared in such way that one can devise a maximal test
yielding with certainty (probability = 1) a particular outcome, then it is said that the quantum system
is in a pure state.’ In turn, the notion of maximal test allows to interpret a quantum observable as being
an actual property —i.e., a property that will yield the answer yes when being measured [25]. It is then
stated that the pure state of a quantum system is described by a unit vector in a Hilbert space which in
Dirac’s notation is written as |ψ〉.
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Depending on the basis, a pure state in H is also represented by a, so called, superposition of states:
|ψ〉 =
∑
ai|ϕ〉i
As a consequence, depending on the choice of the basis, a pure state might also yield uncertain results.
Indeterminate or potential properties pertaining to superposed states might, or might not become actual-
ized in a future instant of time; they are uncertain properties which cannot be considered as elements of
physical reality (in the EPR sense [18]) nor interpreted in terms of ignorance (see e.g., [25]). Asher Peres
explains this important point in the following manner:
“According to quantum theory, we have a choice between different, mutually incompatible tests. For
example, we may orient the Stern-Gerlach magnet in any direction we please. Why then is such a
Stern-Gerlach test called complete? The reason can be stated as the following postulate:
A. Statistical determinism. If a quantum system is prepared in such a way that it certainly yields
a predictable outcome in a specified maximal test, the various outcomes of any other test have definite
probabilities. In particular, these probabilities do not depend on the details of the procedure used for
preparing the quantum system, so that it yields a specific outcome in the given maximal test. A system
prepared in such a way is said to be in a pure state.” [23, p. 66]
The notion of pure state can be also extended to density operators. Let H be a Hilbert space. A
density operator ρ (i.e. a positive trace class operator with trace 1) is called a state. Being positive and
self-adjoint, the eigenvalues of ρ are non-negative and real and it is possible to diagonalize it. Pure states
are represented by rank 1 matrices matrices which in their diagonal form will be given by (1, 0, . . . , 0).
In this case, ρ is equal to vv† for some normalized vector v ∈ H. Thus, if the rank of ρ is grater than 1
(or equivalently if Tr(ρ2) < 1), the state is called a mixed state; or in short, a mixture. For example, the
vector α|0〉 + β|1〉, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, gives the following density matrix:
ρ =
(
|α|2 αβ
αβ |β|2
)
Notice that, if ρ is a pure state (i.e., Tr(ρ2) = 1), there always exists a basis in which the matrix can be
diagonalized as:
ρpure =
(
1 0
0 0
)
Unlike the case of pure states, mixtures cannot be represented as a unit vector, |ψ〉. Instead, mixed states
are conceived as mixtures of pure states and represented as convex sums of them:
ρmix =
∑
i
pi ρ
pure
i =
∑
i
pi |Ψi〉〈Ψi|
Thus, while pure states guarantee the existence of an observable which, if measured, will be obtained with
certainty (probability equal to 1), mixed states do not. There will exist no single context of measurement
(no basis) for which a mixed state will predict with certainty a yes-no answer for a specific observable.
Unlike, pure states, mixtures are interpreted in terms of ignorance regarding the pure state in which
the quantum system really is.1 As remarked by Nancy Cartwright in [3]: “The ignorance interpretation
asserts that each member of the collection is in one of the pure states in the sum —it is only our ignorance
which prevents us from telling the right pure state for any specific member.” Thus, contrary to the case
of pure states, when considering mixed states, all observables are uncertain; they all possess a probability
1The reference to ‘mixtures’ —as contra-posed to ‘pure states’— is extremely problematic for it erases the fundamental
distinction between quantum mixture and classical mixture; a well known distinction in the specialized literature which
Bernard d’Espagnat termed proper and improper (see [14, chap. 6]).
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which pertains to the open interval (0, 1). Furthermore, unlike the indeterminate or potential properties
present within quantum superpositions, mixtures restore an ignorance interpretation about pure states.
As remarked by Cartwright: “The ignorance interpretation is the orthodox interpretation for mixtures,
and should not be confused with the ignorance interpretation for superpositions, which has been largely
abandoned.” As an example of a mixed state (i.e., Tr(ρ2) < 1) we can consider the following diagonal
matrix,
ρmixed =
(
1
2
0
0 1
2
)
This mixed state provides minimal knowledge about the pure state the quantum system is presupposed
to be in. Since there is 50 percent chance we have maximal ignorance about the actual state of affairs.
This is the way in which pure states and mixtures are commonly presented within the orthodox
literature. In this paper we attempt to expose the fact that there exists an essential inconsistency already
present within the just mentioned definitions of ‘pure state’ —which are commonly applied, depending on
the context of analysis, within the specialized literature. The definition of pure state was not introduced
by mere chance. In fact, this notion was essential in the application of the positivist understanding of
physical theories to so called “minimal interpretation” of QM. This “minimal interpretation” presented
by Paul Dirac [16] and John von Neumann [28] in the beginning of the 1930s soon became the orthodox
textbook formulation of the theory of quanta. But before considering the intrinsic technical difficulties
of the definition of pure state, in order to understand in depth the already rotten roots of “purity” we
require some historical context to which we will now turn our attention.
2 The 20th Century Positivist Re-Foundation of Physics
In the 20th Century, due to the coming into power of positivism and its empiricist anti-metaphysical
agenda, physics as a discipline was subject to a deep re-foundation. Since the ancient Greeks, physics
had been always understood as a discipline which attempted to describe or express physis —a kernel
Greek concept later on translated as ‘reality’ [4]. The attempt of physicists was to capture aspects
of reality through theories. Their aim was to theoretically represent physical reality. Of course, the
nature and meaning of this representation was not unproblematic. In the 17th Century, Immanuel Kant,
a physicist himself, inaugurated a critical account of representation through which the naive idea of
‘unveiling’ reality as it is was severely questioned. As part of the revolt against those who naively believed
in the possibility of discovering reality in itself, at the end of the 19th Century, Machian positivism begun
to deconstruct the very foundation of classical mechanics itself. Ernst Mach presented a critical analysis
of the notions of absolute space and time implied by Newton’s theory. His investigations led him to
the conclusion that science is nothing but the systematic and synoptical recording of data of experience.
In his Analysis of Sensations, Mach concluded that primary sensations constitute the ultimate building
blocks of science, inferring at the same time that scientific concepts are only admissible if they can be
defined in terms of sensations. From this empiricist standpoint he argued strongly against the existence of
atoms. Metaphysical speculation —understood now as a discourse attempting to go beyond the observed
phenomena— should be erased from scientific inquiry and research. The crisis produced by Mach turned
physics away from (classical) metaphysical presuppositions and closer back to “common sense” human
perception. The result was the coming into being of a completely new idea of physical understanding.
Theories would not be regarded anymore as describing or expressing —in some way— reality. This idea
was too metaphysical, too pretentious. Instead, theories had to be understood in a seemingly more modest
manner, namely, as a simple ‘economy of (human) experience’.
The critical Machian attack against classical Newtonian metaphysics, played also an essential role
in the development of both Relativity and the theory of quanta. But even though QM was developed
taking into account 19th Century positivists anti-metaphysical ideas,2 it remained anyhow strongly linked
2Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics which made explicit use of Mach’s principle of observability is an excellent example. As
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to atomist metaphysics. This scrambling produced very soon a paradoxical entanglement between two
mutually incompatible positions, namely, atomist substantivalism that maintained —in metaphysical
terms— the existence of unobservable atoms, and Machian empirical-positivism which grounding itself
in observed phenomena affirmed the need to eradicate all a priori metaphysical notions from physics
—including of course that of ‘atom’. However, regardless of the obvious inconsistencies, very soon, the
critical analysis of the Newtonian metaphysical picture was forgotten and atomist metaphysics became
regarded —even by positivists— as part of our “common sense” understanding of the world.
Joining forces with positivism, after the IIWW, instrumentalism helped to replace the original foun-
dation of physics grounded on the old metaphysical notion of physis by a more pragmatic one relative to
actual observations of agents. As remarked in [22] Cartwright mentions that “[U.S.] Americans in general
had little anxiety about the metaphysical implications of the quantum theory; and their attitude was
entirely rational given the operationalist-pragmatist-style philosophy that a good many of them shared.”
Today, the entanglement between, on the one hand, an empiricist (anti-metaphysical) instrumentalist
account of physics as a discipline making exclusive reference to “common sense” observations, and on
the other, a deeply rooted classical language making reference to (unobservable) microscopic particles
has crated what might be called a curious “sophistic substantialism” (see for a detailed discussion [8]).
This strange paradoxical conjunction finds its Archimedean point in the notion of actuality which plays a
double role within the debates about the philosophical foundation of QM. Indeed, actuality has two dif-
ferent —not necessarily compatible— meanings and uses which have been confused and scrambled within
the orthodox literature. Firstly, there is an empiricist understanding of actuality as the hic et nunc ex-
perience of an individual agent. According to Bas van Fraassen [27, p. 197], one the most prominent
contemporary empiricists: “the only believe involved in accepting a scientific theory is belief that it is
empirically adequate: all that is both actual and observable finds a place in some model of the theory. So
far as empirical adequacy is concerned, the theory would be just as good if there existed nothing at all
that was either unobservable or not actual. Acceptance of the theory does not commit us to belief in the
reality of either sort of thing.” This first meaning of actuality can be resumed in the following manner:
Definition 2.1 (Empiricist Actuality) Actuality as making reference to hic et nunc observations of
subjects (or agents).
Secondly, actuality is also —implicitly— understood in metaphysical terms as characterizing a mode of
existence independent of observations. In the XVII Century, within the Newtonian mechanical description
of the world, any indetermination —related in the Aristotelian scheme to the potential realm of being—
was erased from the physical representation of reality. Within classical mechanics, every physical system
could be described exclusively by means of its actual properties. As remarked by Dennis Dieks:
“In classical physics the most fundamental description of a physical system (a point in phase space)
reflects only the actual, and nothing that is merely possible. It is true that sometimes states involving
probabilities occur in classical physics: think of the probability distributions in statistical mechanics.
But the occurrence of possibilities in such cases merely reflects our ignorance about what is actual. The
statistical states do not correspond to features of the actual system (unlike the case of the quantum
mechanical superpositions), but quantify our lack of knowledge of those actual features.” [15, p. 124]
This second understanding of actuality which can be defined without any reference whatsoever to ob-
servability is of course purely formal and metaphysical. As discussed in detail in [11], an Actual State of
Affairs (ASA) can be defined as a closed system considered in terms of a set of actual (definite valued)
properties which can be thought as a map from the set of properties to the {0, 1}. Specifically, an ASA is
a function Ψ : G → {0, 1} from the set of properties to {0, 1} satisfying certain compatibility conditions.
remarked by Osnaghi et al. in [22] “During the 1920s and 1930s, the ideas which were to be identified with the ‘orthodox
view’ of quantum mechanics became quite popular. The positivist flavour of the approach developed by Heisenberg, Jordan,
Born and Pauli was not only in tune with the cultural climate of continental Europe between the two wars, but was also well
suited to cope with the change of paradigm that atomic phenomena seemed to demand.”
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We say that the property P ∈ G is true if Ψ(P ) = 1 and P ∈ G is false if Ψ(P ) = 0. The evolution of an
ASA is formalized by the fact that the morphism f satisfies Φf = Ψ. Diagrammatically,
Gt1
Ψ
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊
f
// Gt2
Φ
||②②
②②
②②
②②
{0, 1}
Then, given that Φ(f(P )) = Ψ(P ), the truth of P ∈ Gt1 is equivalent to the truth of f(P ) ∈ Gt2 . This
formalization comprises the idea that the properties of a system remain existent through the evolution
of the system. The model allows then to claim that the truth or falsity of a property is independent of
particular observations. Or in other words, binary-valuations are a formal way to capture the classical
actualist (metaphysical) representation of physics according to which the properties of objects preexist to
their measurement.
Definition 2.2 (Metaphysical Actuality) Actuality as making reference to a mode of existence de-
fined in terms of definite binary valuedness of properties which evolve completely independently of subjects
and their measurements.
Maybe the best exposure of this same scrambling also present within the orthodox understanding
of QM is the definition of element of physical reality presented in the famous 1935 paper by Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen [18].
Element of Physical Reality: If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality
corresponding to that quantity.
As remarked by Diederik Aerts and Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi [1, p. 20]: “An element of reality is a
state of prediction: a property of an entity that we know is actual, in the sense that, should we decide to
observe it (i.e., to test its actuality), the outcome of the observation would be certainly successful.” It is
in this way that the relation between observation and reality is pasted together. Reality is not anymore
defined in terms of a theoretical representation, but instead in terms of “common sense” observability.
It is interesting to notice that the notion of pure state in QM has an analogous role to the one played
by actuality within the present widespread empirical-positivist understanding and analysis of physical
theories. Just like the notion of actuality has a double reference, on the one hand to a metaphysical
mode of existence and on the other to empirical observation, the notion of pure state scrambles a specific
type of contextual measurement in which certainty is restored with a non-contextual mathematical purely
abstract definition which lacks a direct operational reference. As we shall see in the following sections,
this tension —threatening inconsistency— found within the definition(s) of ‘pure state’ is found not only
at the philosophical level of analysis, it is also —maybe more importantly— already present within its
formal definition itself. In order to address this problem it is of outmost importance to remind the kernel
role of invariance and objectivity within the empirical testing of physical theories.
3 Physical Invariance, Objectivity and Empirical Testing
Objective physical concepts require an invariant reference which is not dependent on a specific basis.
Consequently, the question regarding the invariance of operational statements becomes kernel to any
consistent physical discourse. As remarked by Max Born [2]: “the idea of invariant is the clue to a
rational concept of reality, not only in physics but in every aspect of the world.” In physics, it is the
invariance present in the mathematical formalism of the theory which allows us to determine what is to
be considered the same irrespectively of the perspective from which it is being represented. Invariants
capture the objective non-contextual content of a theory by providing a consistent translation between
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different reference frames. Consequently, only invariant notions can be considered independently and
beyond a particular experimental situation (i.e., a context or basis). In physics, invariants are quantities
having the same value for any reference frame. The transformations that allow us to consider the physical
magnitudes from different frames of reference have the property of forming a group. In the case of classical
mechanics we have the Galilei transformations which keep space and time apart, while in relativity
theory we have the Lorentz transformations which introduce an intimate connection between space and
time coordinates. Of course, restricting ourselves to physical magnitudes that remain always the same,
independently of the reference frame, does not provide a dynamical picture of the world, instead such
description only provides a static table of data. Obviously such description is completely uninteresting for
physics, which always attempts to describe, not only how the world is but —far more importantly— how
the world changes. Thus, that which matters the most for physical description is the invariant variations
of physical magnitudes, that is, the dynamical magnitudes which vary but can be considered still the same
(e.g., position, velocity, momentum, energy, etc.). The difference within the identity. More specifically, in
physics it is not only important to consider magnitudes that vary with respect to a definite reference frame
(S), but also the consistent translation that allows us to consider that same variation with respect to a
different frame of reference (S′). This relation (of the values between S and S′) is also provided via the
transformation laws. Such transformations include not only the dynamics of the observables but also the
dynamics between the different observers (see also [10]). Even though the values of physical magnitudes
might also vary from one reference frame to the other —due to the dynamics between reference frames—
, in both classical physics and relativity theory there is a consistent translation between the values of
magnitudes of different frames secured by the transformation laws. The position of a rabbit running
through a field and observed by a distant passenger of a high speed train can be translated to the position
of that same rabbit now taken from the perspective of another passenger waiting on the platform of the
station. The fact that the values of position, momentum, etc., can be consistently translated from one
reference frame to the other allows us to assume that these physical observables bear an objective real
existence completely independent of the specific choice of the reference frame pertaining to each observer.
It is this consistency within translation which allows the physicist to claim that: the rabbit has a set of
dynamical properties (position, a momentum, etc.) independently of any of his particular observers such
as those in the train and on the platform. The important point of this aspect of invariance within physical
theories is that observables of the physical system can be then regarded as independent of the observers,
and consequently, as non-contextual. It is only then that we can thus claim that such properties are
dynamical variations that pertain to the physical system itself.3 The same reasoning can be applied to
coordinate transformations in the phase space Γ. If we consider a set of observables in a coordinate system,
S, and perform a transformation of coordinates (e.g., a rotation) to a new system, S′, then the values of
the observables will be also consistently translated from the system S to the system S′. Such consistency,
which is again secured by the transformation, is the objectivity condition which allows us to consider the
observables as preexistent to the choice of the coordinate system (i.e., the mathematical representation
from which we choose to describe our system). It is in this way, that mathematical invariance allows us to
detach the empirical subject (i.e., the particular observer performing the experiment) from the objective
theoretical representation of physical reality.
But of course, invariance is not the only required feature for physical notions which also need to
provide a clear operational content which allows to test empirically if the concept is or is not the case in
a given situation. The relation between a mathematical formalism, a conceptual scheme and experience
is not a “self evident” given within physical theories. In fact, this interrelation is one of the most complex
and subtle aspects within theory construction. Albert Einstein addressed it explicitly when developing
3In more general terms, as discussed in [11], it is exactly this formal aspect which allows us to talk in terms of an Actual
State of Affairs (ASA) that evolves in time; i.e., a dynamical description in terms of the variation of (objective) definite
valued observables (or ‘dynamical properties’) independent of the (subjective choice of the) perspective (or reference frame)
from which they are being observed. Even in relativity theory, due to the Lorentz transformations, one can still consider
‘events’ as the building blocks of physical reality.
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his special theory of relativity, arguing that every physical concept should be able to provide an explicit
operational connection to both physical reality and experience. Something which —he also stressed—
pure mathematics lacks completely.
“We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line goes through two points. We can only
say that Euclidean geometry deals with things called ‘straight lines,’ to each of which is ascribed the
property of being uniquely determined by two points situated on it. The concept ‘true’ does not tally
with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word ‘true’ we are eventually in the habit of
designating always the correspondence with a ‘real’ object; geometry, however, is not concerned with
the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of
these ideas among themselves.” [17, p. 2]
Pure mathematics does not need to provide a conceptual understanding of its abstract notions. In this
respect, Einstein remarked the fundamental distinction between purely abstract mathematical notions
and physical concepts. When discussing the concept of simultaneity he explained the following:
“The concept does not exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of discovering whether or not
it is fulfilled in an actual case. We thus require a definition of simultaneity such that this definition
supplies us with the method by means of which, in the present case, he can decide by experiment
whether or not both the lightning strokes occurred simultaneously. As long as this requirement is not
satisfied, I allow myself to be deceived as a physicist (and of course the same applies if I am not a
physicist), when I imagine that I am able to attach a meaning to the statement of simultaneity. (I
would ask the reader not to proceed farther until he is fully convinced on this point.)” [17, p. 26]
Thus, there must always exist within a physical theory something like an “operational methodology” which
allows to connect its physical concepts and mathematical formalism with physical experience. Following
this line of reasoning, in [7] we provided the following related definition of ‘meaningful operational state-
ment’ which comprises the operational requirement of physical concepts as related to the mathematical
formalism of a theory. In the context of this discussion we are now able to extend this definition:
Meaningful Operational Statement: Every operational statement within a theory capable of predicting
the outcomes of possible measurements must be considered as meaningful with respect to the representation
of physical reality provided by that theory in connection to a specific frame of reference or basis.
In order to be consistent, a physical concept must be both mathematically invariant and operationally
grounded. Any physical notion must provide, not only a conceptual representation allowing to understand
what is going on according to the theory, but also the conditions of its testing in a given experimental
situation. Furthermore, in order to provide a meaningful objetive discourse both operational and con-
ceptual definitions must be essentially invariant. Since the democracy implied by scientific practice must
allow any observer to refer to a physical concept in a consistent manner its operational content cannot
depend on a preferred basis or reference frame.
4 The (Non-)Contextual Definition(s) of ‘Pure State’
An exposure of the tension found within the already mentioned incompatible reference to the notion of
‘actuality’ is also present in QM within the definition(s) of pure state. As we mentioned above, there is
a coexistence present in the literature provided by two distinct definitions. While there is an operational
definition of pure state grounded on a specific context (or basis) of inquiry, there is also a non-contextual
definition of purity which is provided in purely abstract mathematical terms. Let us analyze these two
different definitions in some detail.
The operational (contextual) definition of pure state rests on a specific type of measurement called
maximal test. Such a test is maximal in the case we obtain with certainty (probability = 1) the observable
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in question: if we measure the state |ψ〉 (in its correspondent basis) we are certain that we will obtain the
measurement result related to this state. This definition rests on the explicit reference to the particular
basis (or context) in which the vector in Dirac’s notation can be written as a single term, namely, as
|ψ〉. We say that the definition is ‘contextual’ because it makes explicit reference to only one context
between the many possible ones. It is only when we arrange the experimental set up in this particular
basis that we will obtain a certain (probability = 1) result. It is only the certainty within measurement
which reflects the purity of a quantum system. Exactly the same actualist intuition appears in the case
of density operators where the state ρ is a pure state, only if there exists a basis in which the matrix can
be diagonalized as:
ρpure =


1 0 . . . 0
0 0
...
. . .
0 0 . . . 0


This contextual definition has the purpose to secure the existence of one observable which will be certain,
and consequently actual, if measured.
Definition 4.1 (Operational Contextual Definition of Pure State) Given a quantum system in
the state |ψ〉, there exists an experimental situation (or context) in which the test of it will yield with
certainty (probability = 1) its related outcome.
In short, a state which is pure is one which provides certainty about measurement.
On the contrary, mathematical physicists —who care not so much about experimental testing of
theories— apply to their reasonings a seemingly different definition of pure state. This definition makes
reference to a purely abstract mathematical feature of vectors, namely, that when considered in terms of
density operators their norm is 1, that is, ρ is a pure state if Tr(ρ2) = 1, or equivalently4 when ρ = ρ2.
This mathematical definition makes no reference whatsoever to any specific basis. It is basis independent.
Definition 4.2 (Mathematical Non-Contextual Definition of Pure State) An abstract vector in
Hilbert space Ψ without any reference to a specific basis.5 Or in terms of density operators, an operator
ρ which is a projector where Tr(ρ2) = 1 or ρ = ρ2.
In this case, unlike the previous definition, the notion of pure state is invariant and obviously non-
contextual. As discussed in [11], in purely abstract mathematical terms we can always talk about a
vector without making reference to a basis. Thus, the abstract vector Ψ makes reference to the state |ψ〉,
but also to any rotation
∑
ai|ϕ〉i. But while the state |ψ〉 will be certain if measured, the state
∑
ai|ϕ〉i
will be not. The same happens with the density operator ρ which makes no reference whatsoever to any
specific basis (see for discussion [5]).
This operational-mathematical conundrum has its root in a confusion present within the specialized
literature, namely, that between a mathematical equivalence and a physical one. Indeed, that which is
equivalent from a mathematical perspective of analysis is not a necessarily equivalent from a physical
standpoint. As we discussed above —and explicitly remarked by Einstein—, a physical concept does
not exist —for the physicist— until he has the possibility of discovering whether or not it is fulfilled
in an actual case. Since the operational content of a pure state is only related to certainty, and in the
case of QM certain predictions are only found in one single basis, the purity of a state can be only
tested within a single frame of reference (or basis). This becomes explicit through the derivation of a
Corollary to the Kochen-Specker theorem in [10] which shows that there does not exist a valuation for
the dynamical properties that constitute a physical system. Indeed, we define as Value Invariance of
4A density matrix can be diagonalized, thus giving a set of eigenvalues 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ . . . < λn ≤ 1 with
∑
i
λi = 1. If
Tr(ρ2) = 1, then λ1 = . . . = λn−1 = 0 and λn = 1. Hence, rk(ρ) = 1 and then ρ = |v〉〈v| and ρ = ρ
2. Conversely, if ρ = ρ2 it
has eigenvalues 0 or 1, but from
∑
i
λi = 1 it follows λ1 = . . . = λn−1 = 0 and λn = 1. Hence, Tr(ρ
2) = 1.
5Like in [12] we distinguish here between the purely abstract vector Ψ and its specific representation in a basis |ψ〉.
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Dynamical Properties (VIDP) that the set of dynamical properties that constitute a physical system must
be invariant under transformations of frames or coordinates. We say that the context A commutes with
the context B if AB = BA for all A ∈ A and B ∈ B. In particular, if A is maximal and commutes with
B, then B ⊆ A and any LV defined over A is defined over B. We have the following result,
Theorem 4.3 Let v be a LV defined over a maximal context A and let x ∈ H be any vector. There
exists a rotation of x where v is defined and there exists a rotation where v is not defined. In particular,
valuations are not preserved under rotations.
Proof: see [10]. 
The previous theorem implies that under a rotation in H the valuation is lost. Even though the vector
x ∈ H is fixed, the coordinate system is fundamental in order to valuate x. We must choose another
valuation or else the value of x may not be defined. Consequently, we find the following Corollary to
Kochen-Specker Theorem.
Corollary 4.4 If the dimension of the Hilbert space H is greater that 2, then the V IDP of a vector in
H is precluded.
This Corollary makes explicit the fact that the operational definition of pure state can only make sense
in single basis, and consequently, cannot be regarded as an invariant definition.
In order to fix ideas, given a pure state written in the x-basis as a unit vector | ↑x〉, we know that if we
measure this state in the same x-basis we will obtain with certainty a result related with this state. The
probability of observing a measurement related to the state | ↑x〉, given we prepare the experimental set
up in the x-basis, will be equal to unity. Of course, in this last statement it is the conditional which is of
outmost importance ‘given we prepare the experimental set up in the x-basis’. However, if we consider the
same unit vector now measured in the z-basis, for which we represent our state as c1| ↑z〉+ c2| ↓z〉, there
will be no certainty with respect to the measurements that could be performed. Now, a simple question
shows the equivocity within the definition(s) of pure state: is the state c1| ↑z〉 + c2| ↓z〉 pure or is it
not? While the operational definition referring to | ↑x〉 provides maximal information, the mathematical
definition of pure state which refers to any other possible decomposition of the vector (e.g., c1| ↑z〉+c2| ↓z〉)
clearly does not. While from an operational viewpoint the state written in the z-basis does not relate to a
maximal test (i.e., there is no certainty, and consequently no purity regarding the possible measurement
results), from a mathematical viewpoint since it is the same unit vector, the state is considered as pure.
The difficulty raises because in QM the basis (or reference frame) is linked to an operational content which
is not considered from an abstract mathematical (basis-independent) perspective. Even though all states
provide a meaningful probabilistic link to operational statements, within the orthodox account —through
the introduction of the notion of purity—the only predictions considered as relevant are those related to
probability equal to 1. This distinction however, is not addressed within the mathematical definition of
purity which treats all states on equal footing.
To sum up, while the operational definition of purity has meaning in terms of certain measurements
but is non-invariant (it can be only observed within a single basis referring to a single experimental
situation), the mathematical definition of pure state is invariant but has no operational counterpart.
Thus, depending on the choice of the definition, the concept of purity is either invariant or non-invariant,
operational or purely abstract. This situation is obviously problematic for any physical theory that would
attempt to provide a consistent meaning to the concepts it talks about. The notion of pure state has
a double definition, on the one hand, in terms of a contextual (non-invariant) measurement, and on the
other, in terms of a purely invariant (non-contextual) abstract mathematical feature of vectors. We find
here a shift with no relation of continuity between the contextual “common sense” operational account
and its abstract mathematical counterpart. Threatening inconsistency, pure states are used and defined in
a seemingly paradoxical manner, both contextual and non-contextual, both invariant and non-invariant.
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5 Restoring the Democracy of States: Intensive Valuations
In this paper we have discussed the untenability of the notion of pure state in the orthodox formalism
of QM. As we argued, the definition of a physical concept cannot be both invariant and non-invariant
or operational and non-operational. If purity is regarded as a property of quantum systems, from an
operational standpoint of analysis —unlike the case of the rabbit which possesses all its properties in-
dependently of the reference frame from which it is being witnessed— a quantum state will reflect its
purity only within a preferred basis. The purity of a state (i.e., its certainty regarding an experimental
test) does not exist in all possible bases. Purity is a preferred basis non-invariant property. As we have
attempted to make clear, this is a serious drawback for any consistent interpretation of a physical con-
cept. However, we believe there is a way out of this operational-mathematical conundrum created by the
artificial introduction of binary certainty within the orthodox quantum formalism.
The first thing we must acknowledge in order to advance in a consistent manner is that the reference to
pure states has been introduced on metaphysical grounds, but is not essential to the orthodox formalism of
the theory. The distinction introduced by this notion between projection operators in completely artificial.
However, as we have discussed in [6], if certainty is extended beyond binary values and considered in
intensive terms it is still possible to restore an objetive invariant account of the mathematical formalism
of the theory. The key for this procedure is to respect the mathematical formalism and its invariant
structure given by the Born rule. As it is well known, a Corollary of the Kochen-Specker theorem [19] is
that in quantum theory there is no invariance of observables when considering the binary valuations of
properties pertaining to different contexts; i.e., there does not exist a Global Binary Valuation. However,
as shown in [11], if we give up the restriction implied by binary certainty —which, in turn, is applied
to the interpretation of the mathematical formalism through the notion of pure state— and advance
towards an intensive definition of physical quantities, it is then possible to restore a Global (Intensive)
Valuation for all projection operators without any inconsistencies. As mentioned above, the key which
opens this possibility is the invariant character of the Born rule itself which, taken seriously, implies that
the elements of physical reality described by QM are not of a binary nature. Instead, they require an
intensive form of quantification. Consequently, If we finally abandon the metaphysical picture of binary-
type observations (or properties), there is space to restore theoretical objectivity and the subjects (or
agents) performing experiments can be regarded as completely detached from the quantum theoretical
representation of physical reality (see for a detailed discussion [9, 11, 12, 13]). QM has been dogmatically
constrained by particle metaphysics and binary testing. We believe that the price that we must be willing
to pay for a proper understanding of the theory of quanta is the reconsideration of its conceptual reference.
Something that was already remarked by Wolfgang Pauli almost one century ago:
“When the layman says ‘reality’ he usually thinks that he is speaking about something which is self-
evidently known; while to me it appears to be specifically the most important and extremely difficult
task of our time to work on the elaboration of a new idea of reality.” [20, p. 193]
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